In this chapter a short statement of the mutual rights of the heir-at-law and the personal representative, and of the remainder man and the personal representative of a life tenant is proposed to be given.
In case of the decease of a person seised in fee simple of lands in the actual possession of his tenants, the heir-at-law is entitled only to the proportion of the rents accruing from the day of his decease whenever it occurs, and the executor or administrator to the proportion up to the day of the decease (Moore v. Moore, Lib. Saccar, 1736, Teare v. Moore Lib. Seac. 1713, and Lace v. Shimmin, Lib. Plitor, 1796, Adv. N.B. 346.)
In case the lands have been in the actual occupation of the deceased himself, and consist of farming lands, the heir-at-law on his decease is entitled to immediate possession of the whole, unless the deceased had made preparations by ploughing or manuring, &c., for a succeeding crop. Of the portions of the lands so prepared, or partially prepared for crop, the executor or administrator is entitled to retain possession until the crop for which the preparation has so been made shall be severed and removed. This right is called in the Island "the executor's crop." The extent of the right, of course, depends upon the state of the lands at the proprietor's decease. In [145] Skillicorn, p. 145 Adv. N.B., the executor was decided by the Staff of Government to be entitled to an executor's crop out of a field, a portion of which had been sown with wheat by deceased, the remaining portion having the last year's crop of potatoes still in the ground, subject to a right to the heir-at-law to enter and sow at the proper time grass seeds for his own use amongst the executor's corn crop; also to a crop out of a field which had been ploughed and partially manured for potatoes, and a field ploughed for a barley crop, and also to a crop of hay of lands which had been sown with grass seeds along with the preceding crop by the deceased. In this case the deceased had died on the 28th December. In Caley v. Caley, Adv. N.B. 212, the deceased had died on the 8th December, previously to which two fields, one of which had been green cropped, and the other had been sown with rye grass and clover the preceding spring, were ploughed for wheat.
Held that the executor was entitled to the crop although the breaking-up of the sown grass field had been against the rules of good farming. In Kewley v. Bridson, Adv. N.B. 291, the deceased died on the 1st March. Her executor was held entit1ed to a crop out of lands ploughed for oats before her decease.
In Christian v. Cowell, Adv. N.B. 344, the Staff of Government, on appeal with the concurrence of the Keys to whom a case had been sent for opinion, decided that the administrator was entitled to the fruit of an orchard belonging to a proprietor who had died after the 12th May.
[146] The law respecting "Executor's crops" is the same between the executors or administrator of a life tenant, and the remainderman, as between heir-at-law and administrator.
The case of Skillicorh v. Skillicorn referred to was between the administrator pendente lite of the life tenant and the remainderman. Caley v. Caley was between the executor of a widow who held in dower and the heir-at law, and Kewley v. Bridson was between remainderman and the executors of a life tenant. The latest case on the point on the Island is the Administrator of Kneale v. Skinner, decided in November 1857, by the Staff of Government on appeal. The deceased had died on the 20th January, a few days before which he had executed in favour of defendant a deed of gift or settlement of the land, commencing possession on the grantor's decease.
Previous to the date of the Settlement the lands had been sown with wheat. It was argued for the grantee that the deed of gift operating after the grantor's decease was similar to a will, and that defendant being in effect a devisee was entitled to the crop in the lands at the grantor's decease as a devisee would be. For the administrators it was admitted (Cooper v. Wolpit, Juris. 870, 12th September, 1857), that a devisee would take the crop along with the land, but it was denied that Skinner was in the position of a devisee. This deed was a customary settlement operating as a deed inter vivos, and its effect was to constitute the deceased [147] a life tenant and Skinner a remainderman, each having vested interests, and that an incident of the life estate was the right to the executor's crop. Held that the administrators were entitled to the crop.